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Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs 
during the three international economic crises of 1981-1984, 1990-1994 and 2008-2013. 
Encompassing 19-23 advanced democracies, the statistical analysis suggests that partisan 
effects have increased over time and are characterized, in the two last crises, by a “new 
asymmetry” whereby left governments pursued more contractionary fiscal policies than non-
left governments over the course of the business cycle. Furthermore, it attributes left 
governments’ endorsement of austere fiscal policies to the constraining effects of financial 
markets in the context of high/surging debt. This is supported by qualitative analysis of select 
government responses to the Global Financial Crisis, shedding new light on the new austerity 
that started in the early 2010s. The ideological mix with political partisanship during hard times 
surely is confusing to ordinary citizens. The paper cautiously points to a neglected yet important 
international economic origin of our political discontents. 
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A consensus appears to have emerged about the uniformity of macroeconomic policy 
responses and the convergence of fiscal policy reactions by left and right governments to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in advanced democracies.1 Governments reacted with a two-
pronged approach (Auerbach et al., 2010; Blyth, 2013; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2015; Hall, 
2013; Mandelkern, 2016). In their initial response, they resorted to fiscal stimulus to preempt a 
full-blown economic collapse. Left and non-left governments did not differ regarding the size 
and composition of the stimulus packages they implemented during the Great Recession 
(Ansell, 2012; Armingeon, 2012; Raess and Pontusson, 2015; Toloudis, 2015). Starting in late 
2009, amidst a fragile recovery and changing rhetoric internationally (G-20, EU Council, 
European Central Bank), governments progressively switched to fiscal tightening (amidst 
continued monetary easing). Left and right party positions adopted during election campaigns 
in the aftermath of the GFC in 11 advanced economies converged on the necessity of budgetary 
rigor (Bremer, 2018). Did left governments adopt austere fiscal policies on a similar or even 
larger scale (and of a similar type) than non-left governments? If so, why did left governments 
embrace austerity? 
While these are important questions in and of themselves, they are here examined in the 
broader context of the partisan politics of fiscal policy responses to international crisis in 
historical perspective. By focusing on the last three economic crises (1981-1984, 1990-1994, 
2008-2013)2 and by carefully distinguishing between the recession and recovery phases of the 
business cycle, this paper addresses the questions of the partisan conduct of fiscal policy along 
and over the course of the cycle and of changing partisan dynamics over time. This places the 
paper in the distinguished political economy tradition of crisis response studies (Bermeo and 
                                                          
1 The variation in macroeconomic policy responses is larger if Central and Eastern European countries 
are included (Armingeon 2012; Walter 2016). 
2 At the time of writing, the global crisis of COVID-19 is still unfolding. 
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Pontusson, 2012; Gourevitch, 1986; Kahler and Lake, 2013; Pontusson and Raess, 2012; 
Scharpf, 1991; Starke et al., 2013). 
Inspired by the “old” literature on the politics of macroeconomic management that 
posits that left and right parties have systematically different economic priorities (Garrett, 1998; 
Hibbs, 1977), I focus on two questions regarding cross-sectional partisan effects. First, 
compared to non-left governments, are left governments more likely to pursue expansionary 
fiscal policies over the business cycle, presumably because they are more inclined to stimulate 
aggregate demand and to rely on spending increases during international downturns? Second, 
do left governments pursue “counter-cyclical” and non-left governments “pro-cyclical” fiscal 
policies over the course of the cycle, so that left governments are more likely to engage in 
expansionary fiscal policies during downturns and in contractionary policies during upturns? 
Furthermore, regarding the temporal comparison, I ask: have “old” partisan effects over fiscal 
policy during major crises declined over time due to changing political-economic environment, 
as much of the political economy literature suggests (e.g., Cusack, 1999; Scharpf, 1991)? 
Encompassing 19-23 advanced democracies, cross-sectional analysis of recession and 
early recovery episodes across the three crises calls into question three commonly-held views: 
a) left governments pursue more expansionary fiscal policies than non-left governments over 
the cycle; b) partisan effects over fiscal policy are symmetrical along the cycle; c) partisan 
effects have narrowed (or disappeared) over time. I identify a “new asymmetry” in the partisan 
effects over fiscal policy in the last two crises. In the early 1990s, left governments were less 
prone to stimulate than non-left governments during the downturn, but they were no less (or 
more) prone to consolidate during the upswing. In the wake of the GFC, left governments were 
no more inclined than non-left governments to stimulate or increase spending during the 
downturn while they were more inclined to engage in fiscal consolidation during the recovery. 
We thus have the counterintuitive finding that left governments pursued more restrictive 
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policies than non-left governments over the course of the business cycle in the past two crises. 
Why have left governments championed austerity in response to crisis since the early 1990s but 
not earlier? Further statistical analysis shows that as countries accumulate more debts over time, 
especially during crises, financial market pressures over debt financing increasingly impel left 
governments to enact more austere fiscal policies than non-left governments. This is supported 
by qualitative analysis of select country responses in the late 2000s, which gets special attention 
given the political and economic significance of the new austerity that started in the early 2010s. 
The fiscal policy data I use has been adjusted for the budgetary effects of business 
cycles, and therefore capture fiscal policy outputs associated with revenue and spending 
decisions governments make in response to changing economic conditions. There is some 
debate about whether outcome-based measures capture policymakers’ intentions to increase or 
reduce the budget balance. An alternative approach focuses on discretionary choices regarding 
revenue and expenditure motivated by government’s desire to reduce the budget deficit 
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Hardiman, 2015; Devries et al., 2011; Mauro, 2011). 
Unfortunately, Devries et al.’s (2011) dataset focuses only on episodes of fiscal consolidation 
and has limited spatial and temporal coverage. The qualitative analysis helps provide a deeper 
understanding of the process of crisis management with a focus on government intentions and 
timing. 
Fiscal policy is not only central to economic stability, but it is also important for 
understanding government objectives. A government’s economic priorities are reflected in its 
national budget. Since the emergence of market economies, the economic dimension has been 
a major axis around which the political space has been structured, defining distinguished party 
positions with left parties supportive of state intervention. Survey data in advanced economies 
consistently show that left-leaning individuals are more likely to support redistribution 
(Mosimann and Pontusson, 2017), and, as a corollary, individuals believe that left parties 
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champion such policies more than center-right parties. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the party 
system and of the democratic order still hinge on the assumption of traditional partisan effects. 
The ideological mix with political partisanship during hard times surely is confusing to ordinary 
citizens. It also likely has dire political consequences. 
 
1. Literature review 
 The “old” literature on the effects of government partisanship on macroeconomic policy 
and of the conditional effect of economic conditions (Carlsen, 1997; Cusack, 1999; Hibbs, 
1977) expects left governments to pursue more expansionary fiscal policies (i.e., run larger 
deficits and increase spending more) than non-left governments over the course of the business 
cycle (Alesina et al., 1993: 16-18; Oatley, 1999). Such partisan effects are mainly driven by 
differences during downturns (Carlsen, 1997), as left governments face conflicting incentives 
during early recoveries—either to hold on to fiscal stimulus to bolster a fragile recovery or to 
withdraw from it as the rise in unemployment slows down. I refer to such asymmetrical partisan 
effects over the cycle as the “old asymmetry”. 
Alternatively, left governments are expected to run counter-cyclical and non-left 
government pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Cusack, 1999). The former will enact more 
expansionary policies than the latter during downturns but more contractive policies during 
upturns. Meanwhile, left governments will be more likely than non-left governments to increase 
outlays during recessions and to raise taxes during recoveries (Mulas-Granados, 2006; Tavares, 
2004). I refer to such symmetric partisan effects over the cycle as the “old symmetry”. 
Regarding cross-temporal change, it is commonplace to argue that the political space 
for “old” partisan differences over the size and composition of fiscal policies has narrowed, if 
not disappeared altogether, due to changing political-economic circumstances since the late 
1970s (Cusack, 1999; Oatley, 1999; Scharpf, 1991). Featuring prominently among the secular 
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changes constraining governments’ budgetary decisions are the ascendancy of monetarist ideas 
(McNamara, 1998), economic globalization (Garrett, 1998), the growth of the welfare state 
(Darby and Melitz, 2008), new forms of macroeconomic governance (Baskaran, 2009), and 
electoral risks surrounding fiscal consolidation (Hübscher and Sattler, 2017). 
In line with this prediction, research suggests that partisanship has little to no traction to 
explain cross-national variation in fiscal policy reactions to the GFC (Ansell, 2012; Armingeon, 
2012; Raess and Pontusson, 2015; Toloudis, 2015).3 Scholars point to government structures 
(Armingeon, 2012), the European Monetary Union (Cameron, 2012), trade openness (Cameron, 
2012; Pontusson and Raess, 2012), and varieties-of-capitalism (Toloudis, 2015) to explain the 
extent of discretionary fiscal stimulus during the Great Recession. Mandelkern (2016) argues 
that a common structure of macroeconomic governance has led to (configurative) uniformity 
of macroeconomic policy responses. Others have referred to the idea of “expansionary fiscal 
contraction” (Blyth, 2013; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2015) and to strategic interactions among 
trade partners (Beckman, 2018) to explain why governments of all persuasions reversed course 
and adopted austerity from 2010 onward. Still others argue that financial markets 
indiscriminately constrained fiscal policymaking in the European periphery during the 
sovereign debt crisis (Chang and Leblond, 2015; Thompson, 2016; see also Schmidt 2014). 
 
2. The argument 
The literature has paid insufficient attention to the external constraints surrounding 
fiscal policymaking by left governments against the background of crisis-related surging debt. 
I argue that financial market pressures are an effective constraint of left government action in 
response to crisis. Specifically, I expect a “new asymmetry” whereby left governments are 
                                                          
3 Ansell (2012) and Raess and Pontusson (2015) show that the effect of partisanship on fiscal policy in 
2008-2009 is conditional on housing booms and on the size of the welfare state, respectively. 
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significantly more likely than non-left governments to engage in fiscal consolidation over the 
business cycle. My argument suggests that traditional partisanships patterns are overcome and 
in fact reversed during crises in an age of high public indebtedness and capital market openness. 
The idea that markets have a preference for right-leaning governments features 
prominently in the literatures on the politics of sovereign debt and on the effect of financial 
markets on economic policies (Breen and McMenamin, 2013; Kaplan, 2013; Mosley, 2000). 
International investors are primarily concerned about inflation, budget deficits and debt 
(Mosley, 2000: Table 1). Bond market actors worry about deficits financed via government 
borrowing that result in large debts. They worry about incentives to default or to inflate away 
public debt. In comparison, market participants care less about government spending as long as 
deficits can be closed by increased revenues (Mosley, 2000: 749). This may have changed from 
the mid-1990s onward with the rise of the idea of “expansionary fiscal consolidation”. It 
contends that fiscal contraction can be expansionary in the short-run, and that consolidation 
through spending cuts (tax increases) tends to be expansionary (contractionary) (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2009; Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina et al., 1998; see also Mulas-Granados, 2006). 
This became an established idea among academics and policy experts (Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 
2015), arguably altering beliefs and expectations of market participants about what they want 
to see happen—not only balanced budgets, but also expenditure-based adjustments. 
Market participants prefer right governments because they associate left governments 
with higher deficits (and arguably a lower propensity to slash spending to balance budgets). 
Left governments imply higher default or inflation risks, and therefore they have a lower 
credibility as sovereign debtors. To international investors, government ideology works as an 
information shortcut for deeper economic policy preferences. Accordingly, they charge an 
interest rate premium on fresh borrowing by left governments. Mosley (2000) finds that left 
governments pay a higher interest rate on long-term government bonds, while Breen and 
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McMenamin (2013) show that a change in government ideology toward the right correlates 
with a significant reduction in the interest rate on sovereign debt. 
Capital mobility changes the incentives faced by indebted left governments. Amidst a 
severe crisis, when deficits and debt surge, borrowing costs by left governments will be 
spiraling upwards, further increasing debt. This may reach a point where further debt financing 
is unsustainable. To tame nervousness among bond investors and allow borrowing at reasonable 
cost, that is, at levels similar to right governments, left governments will be compelled to pursue 
more restrictive fiscal policies. In other words, left governments need to pursue more severe 
austerity programs than non-left governments to compensate for their “credibility gap”. 
In sum, when public debt is skyrocketing, I expect bond markets to compel left 
governments down the path of fiscal consolidation, generating partisan divergence over fiscal 
policy outputs. Specifically, at high levels of debt, left governments will pursue more restrictive 
fiscal policies over the business cycle than non-left governments (hypothesis one). Whether 
markets are concerned about deficits only or, as implied by the idea of “expansionary fiscal 
consolidation”, about deficits and spending is an open question. 
Regarding cross-temporal partisan effects, as said, there is a widespread expectation that 
“old” partisan effects have decreased over time. In terms of the timing of the decline, the Long 
Recession of 1974-1982 is often seen as marking the end of the Keynesian era (Scharpf, 1991). 
By contrast, my theory expects partisan effects of the “new” type (i.e., the “new asymmetry”) 
to increase over time (hypothesis two). First, the “new” partisan effects move in tandem with 
public debt and international bond markets, which have both grown on average in advanced 
economies since the mid-1970s. Second, the average debt increase grew bigger in successive 
crises. While the quantitative analysis tests both the cross-sectional and cross-temporal effects, 
the qualitative analysis only tests the former (in the last crisis). 
8 
 
What about the timing of the “new” partisan effects within the cycle? Arguably, a major 
downturn may unleash an emergency where all governments, irrespective of their ideological 
position, pursue an activist fiscal policy following a “rally around the flag” logic. While this 
may damp partisan effects over the size of the initial stimulus, one might still observe partisan 
effects over the composition of fiscal policy. Nonetheless, the increase in debt caused by the 
initial stimulus might carry such weight as to tip the balance toward action by bond market 
actors. The partisan divergence is thus likely to occur once the initial downturn turned into a 
sovereign debt crisis consecutive to counter-cyclical state intervention, that is, either during a 
subsequent downturn, in the context of a protracted crisis, or during an early recovery. 
 
3. Research design and data analysis 
Building on the rich scholarship on crisis responses, and against the backdrop of the 
claim that partisan effects have narrowed, I focus on international economic crises. Crises 
arguably constitute “most likely cases” of partisan effects. Due to economic hardship, crises 
increase the salience of economic issues (Bremer, 2018). Governing (and opposition) parties 
come under pressure to respond to the socio-economic dislocation endured by their core 
electoral constituencies. Amidst uncertainty, parties may fall back on policies that they have 
relied upon in the past—that is one of the lessons of the 1970s (Hall, 2013: 143). Accordingly, 
“old” partisan patterns may have resurfaced in recent crises. Meanwhile, there is an intrinsic 
openness to politics in times of crisis (Gourevitch, 1986: 239-240). Crises can present 
governments with a relatively wide space of action as they might minimize the burden of past 
policies on present decisions. They might constitute “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier, 
1991) in which particular decisions, deliberately chosen or imposed by circumstances, 
predispose subsequent developments. Either way, there is much to gain from detailed analysis 
of the drivers of change at key historical moments, such as the 2010 turn to austerity (Blyth, 
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2013; Hay, 2010). Cognizant of this and the fact that I focus on the role of government 
partisanship in fiscal policy responses to international crises, the present research design—
which combines multiple cross-sectional analysis covering three crises with qualitative analysis 
of the politics of fiscal consolidation in selected cases in the late 2000s, including two pairwise 
comparisons between “most similar” cases—is well suited to tackle the question(s) at hand. It 
is not intended to test the argument for the entire period including long spells of relative 
economic stability using cross-sectional time-series analysis, and I leave that question for future 
research. 
Due to data constraints on the dependent variables that extend no further back than 1980, 
I focus on the following international crises caused by external shocks: the crisis of the early 
1980s, following the second oil shock of 1979 and the sharp rise in oil prices (and inflation); 
the crisis of the early 1990s, resulting from geopolitical instability (fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, collapse of the Soviet Union, First Gulf War of 1990-1991) compounded by several 
domestic banking/currency crises; and the aftermath of the GFC, namely the Great Recession 
and the sovereign debt crisis. While the origins and the nature of the three crises were different, 
the commonality is that they are characterized by a sudden deterioration of macroeconomic 
indicators (GDP growth, unemployment, public debt) and experienced simultaneously by a 
large number of countries.4 To mitigate the risk that idiosyncratic factors explain the pattern 
found in the analysis, the fiscal policy data I use has been adjusted for the large one-off fiscal 
transactions that distort the accuracy of cyclically-adjusted fiscal balances, such as the bank 
bailouts in 2008-2009 (OECD, 2008). Additionally, in robustness checks, I control for factors 
that are specific to a crisis or period. 
An international crisis is a relatively bounded phenomenon. I delimit recession and 
recovery years for each crisis. I end a “crisis window” with the first international recovery year, 
                                                          
4 For a similar research design, see Starke et al. (2013). 
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unless it is followed by an aftershock. This operationalization does justice to the fact that 
economic crises are often not one-off events. A year qualifies as an international recession when 
more than two-thirds of the countries in the sample experience year-on-year decelerations in 
(real) GDP growth. I obtain the following one- or two-year recession episodes: 1981; 1990-
1991 and 1993; 2008-2009 and 2012. It is worth emphasizing the protracted nature of the last 
two crises, characterized each by two episodes of recession. Similarly, a year is considered an 
international recovery when more than two-thirds of the countries experience year-on-year 
accelerations in economic growth. I obtain: 1984; 1994; 2010 and 201r3. The 2010 recovery 
was highly synchronized as 21 of the 23 countries in the sample experienced year-on-year 
increase in growth between 2009 and 2010 (the average change was 5.5%). Clearly, it was a 
fragile recovery. Earlier or in-between years (1980, 1982-1983; 1989 and 1992; 2007 and 2011) 
do neither qualify as international recession nor as international recovery years. In short, I have 
three crisis windows (1981-1984; 1990-1994; 2008-2013) and estimate partisan effects on 
cross-sections of recessions and recoveries separately. 
The dependent variables capture fiscal policy outputs adjusted for the fluctuations in 
government expenditures and revenues due to the business cycle. Based on OECD data, I 
measure the size of fiscal stimulus (or consolidation) by the year-on-year change in the 
underlying government primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP, and the composition 
of fiscal policy by the year-on-year change in the underlying government current disbursements 
excluding interest as a percentage of potential GDP. For two-year recessions, the variables are 
calculated as the cumulative change over two years. Positive values indicate movements toward 
deficits (i.e., fiscal stimulus) and spending increases, respectively. For ease of interpretation, 
the signs of the variables were reverted for recoveries, so that positive values indicate 
consolidation and spending cuts. 
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 The OECD series for these variables begin in 1980, with one country (New Zealand) 
entering the dataset in the mid-1980s and another three (Germany, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland) in the early 1990s. I exclude the Central and Eastern European countries (and new 
OECD members) because they are characterized by a different historical trajectory and by high 
instability of the party system which render studying partisanship problematic. Therefore, the 
analysis includes 19 advanced democracies in the 1980s (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States), 20 in the 1990s (the 19 and New 
Zealand), and 23 in the 2000s (the 20 and Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland).5 
Left government is measured as the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by left parties, 
defined as socialist, social democratic and Green parties, with US Democrats and Canadian 
Liberals coded as centre parties.6 The coefficient for left governments has to be interpreted as 
the effect of left governments relative to non-left governments, that is, governments composed 
of centre and/or right parties such as Christian democratic and liberal parties, respectively. On 
the premise that changes in revenues and expenditures in a given year are affected by 
government decisions made in the previous and current years, I measure left government as the 
average cabinet share held by left parties over two years for one-year recessions/recoveries and 
over three years for two-year recessions. It is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100. 
Debt is the general government gross financial liabilities as a share of GDP, measured 
in the year preceding the recession (recovery).7 I expect debt to correlate negatively with fiscal 
stimulus during downturns and positively with consolidation during upturns. The joint 
significance of Left and Debt (with both coefficients negative during downturns and positive 
during upturns) would provide some evidence for my theory. 
                                                          
5 Portugal has missing information for the government primary balance but not for disbursements in 
1980, which explains why the analysis of fiscal stimulus in 1981 is based on 18 countries. 
6 Data source is Armingeon et al. (2012, 2020). 
7 Data is from OECD Economic Outlook, No. 75 for the 1980s and 1990s; No. 92&97 for the 2000s. 
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Strictly speaking, however, my theory presupposes an interaction effect. A negative 
(positive) and statistically significant interaction between Left and Debt during downturns 
(upturns) would provide strong evidence for my theory. In a supplementary analysis, I interact 
left government with a proxy for fiscal unsustainability that captures more directly financial 
market pressures via the bond market. I measure Fiscal unsustainability as the product of 
inherited debt and long-term interest rates (i.e., interest rates on 10-year government bonds), 
with the latter commonly thought to reflect sovereign default risks. Specifically, it is measured 
as the sum of standardized scores for Debt and long-term interest rates.8 
Due to the small-N, the baseline model includes only three controls. First, to take into 
account (remaining) cross-national differences in the timing of the cycle, I control for change 
in GDP growth. It is measured as the difference in GDP growth between the first year of a 
recession/recovery and the pre-recession/recovery year for one- and two-year episodes alike.9 
Second, I control for Automatic stabilizers. I use non-elderly social spending (in percent of 
GDP) as the indicator for social protection against the effects of recessions, particularly rising 
unemployment. Using OECD data, it is measured as total public social expenditures minus old-
age expenditures in the year prior to the recession/recovery year(s). Finally, to control for the 
possibility that trade interdependence might reduce the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, I control 
for Trade (exports and imports divided by GDP) in the year prior to the recession/recovery.10 I 
report OLS estimates.11 
I recognize that given the small number of observations, the regression results are at 
best suggestive. Nevertheless, the results from different model specifications and 
                                                          
8 Data on long-term interest rates (current year) are from the OECD. Iceland enters the dataset on long-
term interest rates in 1993, explaining the loss of one observation when using the variable financial 
unsustainability in 1981, 1984 and 1990-1991. 
9 Data on real GDP growth (expenditure approach) are from the OECD. 
10 Data are from the OECD.Stat (Dataset: Macro Trade Indicators). 
11 The standard errors are smaller when I estimate coefficients with robust standard errors. Therefore, 
the statistical tests are conservative. 
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operationalization of recessions/recoveries and from the qualitative analysis are consistent with 
our theory and thus paint a coherent picture of the sources of cross-national and temporal 
variation in fiscal policy responses to crises. 
 
3.1. Results 
Table 1 presents the results for the determinants of fiscal stimulus and consolidation 
during recessions (columns 1-5) and recoveries (columns 6-9), respectively. Left governments 
pursued more expansionary policies in the 1981 downturn and during the Great Recession, but 
the coefficients are statistically insignificant. By contrast, left governments were less likely to 
stimulate aggregate demand than non-left governments during the 1990-1991, 1993 and 2012 
recessions, but the Left coefficient is statistically significant only in 1993. Inherited debt 
constrained governments’ ability to engage in fiscal stimulus in the early 1990s. Smaller 
contraction in GDP growth and larger automatic stabilizers correlate with less stimulus in 1981. 
Regarding upswings, left governments were less likely to consolidate budgets than non-
left governments in 1984 and 1994 but more likely to do so in 2010 and 2013. However, the 
Left coefficient reaches statistical significance only in 2010. Is this result picking up counter-
cyclical fiscal policy behavior along the cycle in line with the “old symmetry”? Comparing 
columns 4 and 8 (or 4-5 and 8-9, for that matter), the answer is “no”: while left governments 
were more inclined to pursue fiscal consolidation in 2010, they were no more prone to engage 
in stimulus in 2008-2009. Highly indebted governments were more likely to consolidate in 
2010. All in all, left governments pursued more restrictive fiscal policies over the cycles of the 
early 1990s and late 2000s/early 2010s.  
14 
 
Table 1. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus/consolidation 
 Downturns Early recoveries 
 1981 1990-91 1993 2008-09 2012 1984 1994 2010 2013 
 DV: stimulus DV: consolidation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Left 0.004 -0.007 -0.020** 0.016 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.021** 0.000 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Debt 0.035 -0.047* -0.046*** -0.010 -0.010 0.011 -0.005 0.032*** 0.003 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) 
GDP growth -0.579** 0.046 -0.174 -0.377 0.110 -0.030 0.014 -0.292*** 0.366* 
 (0.256) (0.294) (0.136) (0.337) (0.197) (0.172) (0.227) (0.099) (0.178) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.261* 0.186 -0.077 -0.126 0.053 -0.077 0.023 0.193 -0.013 
 (0.122) (0.150) (0.067) (0.207) (0.099) (0.110) (0.087) (0.113) (0.078) 
Trade -0.018 0.006 0.010 -0.016 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.008 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.017) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 1.873 1.460 4.137*** 5.731 -0.395 0.354 0.353 -4.544* 0.668 
 (1.320) (2.158) (1.258) (4.017) (1.704) (1.318) (1.370) (2.159) (1.290) 
          
Observations 18 20 20 23 23 19 20 23 23 
R-squared 0.40 0.33 0.54 0.30 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.68 0.30 





Table 2. Government partisanship and spending increases/cuts 
 Downturns Early recoveries 
 1981 1990-91 1993 2008-09 2012 1984 1994 2010 2013 
 DV: spending increases DV: spending cuts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Left -0.003 -0.010 -0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.012 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Debt 0.017 -0.042* -0.016 0.003 -0.005 0.014 0.004 0.015** 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) 
GDP growth -0.357** -0.425 -0.221** 0.134 0.019 -0.128 -0.228 -0.247*** 0.191 
 (0.145) (0.265) (0.096) (0.202) (0.185) (0.098) (0.199) (0.082) (0.159) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.194** 0.012 -0.047 -0.146 0.046 -0.074 0.002 0.054 0.001 
 (0.068) (0.135) (0.047) (0.125) (0.093) (0.063) (0.076) (0.094) (0.070) 
Trade -0.012 0.038* 0.001 0.012** 0.000 0.020* 0.008 0.009** -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 2.486*** 1.603 1.549 3.054 -0.709 -0.080 0.200 -1.290 -0.007 
 (0.736) (1.944) (0.885) (2.415) (1.596) (0.753) (1.199) (1.797) (1.152) 
          
Observations 19 20 20 23 23 19 20 23 23 
R-squared 0.54 0.37 0.39 0.27 0.05 0.53 0.16 0.61 0.13 





Table 2 shows the results for the models with spending increases (columns 1-5) and cuts 
(columns 6-9) as the dependent variables. With one exception, the Left coefficients are far from 
reaching statistical significance. The exception is the upturn of 2010, where left governments 
were more likely to cut spending than non-left governments (p-value=.128). In that year, 
indebted governments were associated with more spending cuts. Might it be that the effect of 
government partisanship on spending cuts in 2010 is conditional on debt level? 
In short, while I do not find partisan effects in the early 1980s, we observe asymmetrical 
partisan fiscal policy patterns that are consistent with the “new asymmetry” in the last two 
crises. These patterns not only deviate from the traditional partisan effects where the left is 
expected to stimulate more than the right in downturns (the “old asymmetry”); they also deviate 
from the classical symmetrical partisan effects whereby the left behaves counter-cyclically and 
the right pro-cyclically (the “old symmetry”). They comport with my cross-temporal theoretical 
predictions (hypothesis two). Importantly, where the coefficient for left government is 
statistically significant, the coefficient for debt is also significant, indicating that high debt 
restricts expansionary fiscal policies. Debt does not have a similarly restricting effect in the 
1980s. Together, this provides a first piece of evidence for my theory about the constraining 
role of financial markets (hypothesis one). 
Next, I directly test my argument about the role of financial markets, starting with 
models including the interaction term Left*Debt (Tables 3-4). Two results stand out, both in 
line with my theory. First, in the 2010 recovery, for both consolidation and spending cuts, while 
the Left coefficients are negative and insignificant, the interaction terms are positive and highly 
significant (columns 8). At high debt levels, left governments were more likely to consolidate 
budget and cut spending than right governments. Second, in the subsequent 2012 recession, the 
constitutive terms Left are positive and insignificant while the coefficient for Left*Debt are 
negative and (weakly) significant (columns 5), suggesting that highly indebted left governments 
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were less likely to stimulate and increase spending than highly indebted non-left governments. 
In short, the constraining effects of financial markets on indebted left governments amidst the 
European sovereign debt crisis span several years. 
The results with the interaction term Left*Financial unsustainability (Tables 5-6) 
confirm that fiscal policy responses to the GFC were characterized by the “new asymmetry” 
and that financial market pressure was a main driver of the observed partisan patterns. 
Compared to the results with Left*Debt, there is one twist: while the patterns for the 2010 upturn 
are similar (columns 8), the results for the 2012 downturn are insignificant (columns 5). Instead, 
we observe a fiscally conservative bias by left governments regarding spending increases when 
financial market pressure is high during the Great Recession (column 4, Table 6). Furthermore, 
left governments were less inclined to cut spending in the 1984 recovery, particularly at low 
levels of debt/financial unsustainability (column 6, Tables 4 and 6). This result sits in-between 
the old and new epochs, being simultaneously a remnant of the Keynesian era and an illustration 
of the constraining effect of financial markets. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for Left*Financial unsustainability on consolidation in 1984 (column 6, Table 5) is 
more difficult to square with existing theories. If anything, this result is reminiscent of the “old 
asymmetry”. 
In sum, I find partisan effects over fiscal policy characterized by the “new asymmetry” 
in the last two crises. Partisan effects have not decreased over time, they have increased and 
they have gone into the reverse. The empirical evidence for the constraining role of financial 
markets on left governments—coming from the correctly signed and statistically significant 1) 
Debt coefficients when new partisan effects are observed (Table 1) and, especially, 2) Left*Debt 
interactions (Tables 3-4) and Left*Financial unsustainability interactions (Tables 5-6) in the 
crisis that unfolded in the late 2000s—is stronger in 2008-2013 than in 1990-1994. It is also 
stronger in the last two crises compared to the 1981-1984 crisis, given the remnants of the “old 
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asymmetry” in the early 1980s. In all, the results are consistent with both my cross-sectional 
and -temporal theoretical predictions (hypotheses one and two). In addition, the analysis reveals 
that financial markets were primarily concerned about balanced budgets in the 1990s, and about 
both balanced budgets and spending cuts in the 2000s, pointing to the increased traction gained 
by the notion of expansionary fiscal consolidation among market participants and governments 
as countries accumulate more debts over time. Finally, the absence of direct partisan effects in 
1981, 1990-1991, and 2008-2009 suggests “rally around the flag” effects in the initial phase of 
international crises. The partisan politicization of fiscal policy during the Great Recession 
concerns spending choices, not fiscal stimulus. 
Why do we not find “new” partisan effects in the 1980s? The cross-temporal analysis 
suggests that high debt is a necessary condition for kind of the partisan effects found in the past 
two crises. Put differently, some sort of debt crisis is a condition for left government credibility 
deficit followed by fiscal rebalancing. As illustration of this, debt never shows up as a 
statistically significant constraint on fiscal policymaking in the 1980s (Tables 1-4). There has 
been a massive surge in average public debt in our samples of OECD countries in the early 
1980s (by 12.2 percentage points over 1980-1983), the early 1990s (14.8 over 1989-1993) and 
late 2000s (20.2 over 2007-2010). In light of my theory, we do not observe reversed partisan 
effects in the 1980s because 1) average public debt increased less than in subsequent crises; 2) 




Table 3. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus/consolidation, conditional on debt level 
 Downturns Early recoveries 
 1981 1990-91 1993 2008-09 2012 1984 1994 2010 2013 
 DV: stimulus DV: consolidation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Left -0.068 0.046 -0.033 0.048 0.019 0.015 0.004 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.027) (0.039) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) 
Left*Debt 0.002 -0.001 0.0002 -0.001 -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0005** 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Debt -0.021 -0.004 -0.056** 0.004 -0.001 0.018 -0.0005 0.016 0.0002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.024) (0.023) (0.009) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.007) 
GDP growth -0.401 -0.045 -0.171 -0.361 0.078 -0.001 0.037 -0.224** 0.340* 
 (0.266) (0.301) (0.140) (0.339) (0.186) (0.180) (0.250) (0.092) (0.186) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.264** 0.247 -0.081 -0.047 0.086 -0.065 0.017 0.098 -0.034 
 (0.115) (0.157) (0.069) (0.227) (0.094) (0.114) (0.092) (0.108) (0.087) 
Trade -0.006 0.005 0.008 -0.015 0.001 0.016 0.006 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.014) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017) (0.014) (0.005) (0.0043) 
Constant 3.744* -2.081 4.944** 3.701 -1.800 -0.243 0.043 -2.005 1.215 
 (1.710) (3.727) (2.034) (4.639) (1.769) (1.590) (1.851) (2.195) (1.597) 
          
Observations 18 20 20 23 23 19 20 23 23 
R-squared 0.51 0.39 0.55 0.33 0.28 0.19 0.05 0.76 0.31 





Table 4. Government partisanship and spending increases/cuts, conditional on debt level 
 Downturns Early recoveries 
 1981 1990-91 1993 2008-09 2012 1984 1994 2010 2013 
 DV: spending increases DV: spending cuts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Left -0.034 0.002 -0.011 0.029 0.028 -0.026* 0.014 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.029) (0.046) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.015) 
Left*Debt 0.001 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004† 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Debt -0.007 -0.032 -0.022 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.015 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006) 
GDP growth -0.275 -0.446 -0.219** 0.143 -0.010 -0.163 -0.169 -0.180** 0.145 
 (0.161) (0.284) (0.099) (0.204) (0.175) (0.094) (0.214) (0.071) (0.160) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.192** 0.026 -0.050 -0.100 0.076 -0.089 -0.012 -0.040 -0.038 
 (0.068) (0.149) (0.049) (0.136) (0.089) (0.060) (0.079) (0.083) (0.075) 
Trade -0.007 0.038 0.0002 0.013** 0.001 0.021** 0.011 0.008** -0.0003 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.0037) 
Constant 3.276*** 0.796 2.075 1.876 -1.965 0.665 -0.606 1.235 0.983 
 (1.015) (3.516) (1.433) (2.793) (1.673) (0.834) (1.587) (1.685) (1.375) 
          
Observations 19 20 20 23 23 19 20 23 23 
R-squared 0.58 0.37 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.62 0.20 0.75 0.21 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 5. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus/consolidation, conditional on financial unsustainability 
 Downturns Early recoveries 
 1981 1990-91 1993 2008-09 2012 1984 1994 2010 2013 
 DV: stimulus DV: consolidation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Left 0.004 0.002 -0.016 0.020 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 0.020** -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Left*financial unsust. 0.007 -0.018 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.023*** 0.0003 0.012* -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.022) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Financial unsust. 0.406 -0.429 -0.538 0.404 -0.398 0.988** 0.289 0.408 0.448* 
 (0.429) (0.702) (0.391) (0.902) (0.250) (0.330) (0.478) (0.333) (0.247) 
GDP growth -0.546** -0.080 -0.101 -0.407 0.200 -0.134 -0.226 -0.069 0.127 
 (0.182) (0.320) (0.164) (0.339) (0.149) (0.139) (0.236) (0.086) (0.215) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.320** 0.059 -0.109 -0.062 0.052 0.019 0.106 0.096 -0.020 
 (0.109) (0.185) (0.088) (0.213) (0.075) (0.082) (0.089) (0.092) (0.073) 
Trade -0.010 0.015 0.004 -0.013 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.010) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 3.525*** -0.650 1.809 3.728 -1.170 0.941 -0.298 -1.526 0.812 
 (1.079) (1.815) (1.236) (3.289) (1.130) (0.870) (0.968) (1.546) (1.075) 
          
Observations 17 19 20 23 23 18 20 23 23 
R-squared 0.69 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.53 0.58 0.16 0.79 0.43 





Table 6. Government partisanship and spending increases/cuts, conditional on financial unsustainability 
   Downturns   Early recoveries 
 1981 1990-91 1993 2008-09 2012 1984 1994 2010 2013 
 DV: spending increases DV: spending cuts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Left -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.009* -0.004 0.013** 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Left*financial unust. 0.002 -0.014 -0.001 -0.028** -0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.014*** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
Financial unsust. 0.337 -0.388 -0.276 0.769 -0.295 0.331 0.610 -0.032 0.065 
 (0.257) (0.679) (0.236) (0.448) (0.260) (0.255) (0.409) (0.220) (0.226) 
GDP growth -0.328*** -0.554* -0.211* 0.084 0.109 -0.241** -0.338 -0.115* -0.012 
 (0.105) (0.309) (0.099) (0.168) (0.155) (0.108) (0.202) (0.057) (0.196) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.189** -0.088 -0.067 -0.096 0.048 0.026 0.036 -0.004 -0.014 
 (0.064) (0.179) (0.053) (0.106) (0.078) (0.064) (0.076) (0.061) (0.066) 
Trade -0.013 0.044 0.001 0.011** -0.001 0.008 0.005 0.008*** 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 3.146*** -0.380 0.861 2.714 -0.958 0.163 0.486 0.071 0.145 
 (0.600) (1.756) (0.744) (1.635) (1.179) (0.674) (0.828) (1.023) (0.982) 
          
Observations 18 19 20 23 23 18 20 23 23 
R-squared 0.73 0.37 0.39 0.51 0.36 0.63 0.29 0.84 0.26 





3.2. Robustness checks 
I perform several robustness checks and a jackknife analysis. First, I include additional 
controls introduced one at the time in the baseline models (see Appendix Table A1 for data 
sources and operationalization).12 I control for the political cycle (election year), institutional 
constraints (one-party governments; and, in the last two crises, EMU), (past) macroeconomic 
policies (short-term interest rates; and, for recoveries, past stimulus/spending increases), and 
economic conditions (current account balance; in the last two crises, banking crisis; and, in the 
last crisis, bank bailouts and IMF/EU bailout). Second, I use an alternative measure of left 
government where I treat US Democrats and Canadian Liberals as left parties. Third, I report 
results for the comparable sample of 19 countries across the three crises. 
The results are shown in Tables A2-A12. The results that hold up all robustness checks 
are the negative association between left government and fiscal stimulus in 1993 (Table A2),13 
and the positive interaction Left*Financial unsustainability in 2010 when the outcome is 
spending cuts (Table A12). Three more results are highly robust, namely the interaction effects 
Left*Financial unsustainability on spending in 2008-2009 (Table A10) and Left*Debt on 
consolidation and spending cuts in 2010 (Tables A5 and A7, respectively).14 Even though we 
lose Iceland (N=18), there is robust evidence that left governments were less likely to 
consolidate under conditions of financial unsustainability in 1984 (Table A8).15 
The jackknife analysis, performed on the baseline models for the above robust results, 
reveals that the results for the two interaction models in 2010 on spending cuts and for the 
                                                          
12 The Appendix can be found online. 
13 The positive association between left government and consolidation in 2010 holds up except for the 
reduced sample (Table A3). 
14 Only in the models that control for IMF/EU bailout do these interaction terms fail to reach statistical 
significance. Arguably, being under IMF/EU bailout is a symptom of (past) fiscal policy choices and 
constraints and therefore should not be controlled for. 
15 All these results are robust to alternative specifications, including substituting change in 
unemployment for change in GDP growth, and controlling for union density, population size, change 
in debt level, and financial sector size. 
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interaction model with financial unsustainability in 1984 on fiscal consolidation are not 
dependent on the inclusion of any particular country. The other results are influenced by 1-2 
specific cases, which is not that surprising, given the small-N. Note that in 1993, the Left 
coefficients border statistical significance when the influential cases (Italy and Portugal) are 
removed (p-values=.111 and .124, respectively). 
Moreover, I consider alternate cut-offs to define international recessions and recoveries. 
By the three-fifth criterion, 1989 and 2011 qualify as recessions. By the three-fourth criterion, 
1981 and 1990 fail to qualify as recessions while 2013 fails to qualify as recovery. This leads 
to the recession “windows” 1989-1991, 1991, and 2011-2012. The results suggest that left 
governments were less inclined to stimulate than non-left governments at high level of financial 
unsustainability in 1989-1991 (Table A13), and that left governments were not only less likely 
to stimulate than non-left governments in 2011-2012 but also less prone to stimulate and 
increase spending at high levels of debt (Table A15). Although the former result barely fails to 
pass one robustness check (Table A16), it nonetheless increases the available evidence for the 
constraining role of financial markets on left governments in the early 1990s. The robustness 
of the latter results when the dependent variable is stimulus (Tables A18-A19) offer compelling 
evidence for enduring capital markets pressure on left governments in the last crisis, covering 
the entire period 2008-2012. 
 
4. Qualitative analysis 
To flesh out the quantitative results and increase confidence in my theory, this section 
delves deeper into the politics of fiscal policy responses in (the run-up to) 2010. I focus on 2010 
because of the robust quantitative findings for that year, and because of the significance of 2010 
as a tipping point in the political and economic history of advanced capitalism. The bulk of the 
discussion centers on two pairwise comparisons between cases that exhibit strong similarities, 
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but that vary in the key predictor government partisanship. Subsequently, I briefly discuss the 
remaining cases of left majority government (including the US, but excluding countries under 
IMF/EU bailout), cases that vary significantly in the key predictor debt level. 
Table 7 shows fiscal policy outputs under different constellations of partisanship and 
debt in 2010. Countries with left majority governments in 2009-2010 were Australia, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, and the UK. On average, left majority governments slashed spending by .83% 
of GDP, left minority governments by .19%, whereas governments without left participation 
increased spending by .25%. A similar story can be told about fiscal consolidation, though the 
difference between governments with some and with no left participation is not significant. 
These differences do not depend on a particular coding of the Obama administration.  
Clearly, financial markets played a huge role during the EU sovereign debt crisis that 
begun in 2010 (Blyth, 2013; Chang and Leblond, 2015; Thompson, 2016). Whereas bond 
market pressure was largely absent before the GFC,16 it emerged as an important constraint on 
governments in the aftermath of the Greek bailout. Bond market actors compelled governments, 
particularly in the Southern periphery of Europe, to adopt austerity (Blyth, 2013: 62-71). As 
Kaplan (2013: 20) put it: 
High levels of bond market indebtedness have placed the developed world, from 
Greece and Ireland to Portugal, Italy and Spain under the microscope of global 
capital markets. To contain the economic and financial fallout of capital 
withdrawal, these countries have adopted a raft of austerity measures. 
 
At closer inspection, however, bond market pressure varied significantly in Southern European 
countries. Also, financial market pressures were not strictly limited to the European periphery. 
Is there any qualitative evidence of bond markets compelling indebted left (but not right) 
governments into a trade-off between adopting austerity and spiraling borrowing costs in 2010? 
  
                                                          
16 Government bond yields in the Eurozone had essentially converged (Table 8). 
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- size of spending cuts (as % GDP) in bold 
- size of consolidation (as % GDP) in parenthesis; positive numbers indicate movement towards 
surplus  
- public debt level measured in 2009 
- averages (bottom quadrant) exclude Greece, Iceland and Ireland under IMF/EU bailout 
- Debt-to-GDP ratios above 60% and especially 90% arguably negatively impact growth (Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009). 
 
 
4.1. Pairwise comparisons 
The comparisons are Spain-Italy and Portugal-France. The four belong to the 
Mediterranean type of capitalism (varieties-of-capitalism classification) and the conservative 








PRT: .77 (.83) BEL: -.09 (.53)
High Debt FRA: -.12 (.78)
(>90%) ITA: .05 (1.08)
JPN: -1.09 (-.26)
ESP: .86 (2.69) AUT: .23 (.55) CAN: -.49 (-1.19)
Medium Debt GBR: .36 (1.41) DEU: -.06 (-1.03) USA: -.47 (.32)
(>60% ; ≤90%) NLD: -.33 (1.25)
AUS: .88 (.45) LUX: 1.08 (.2) DNK: .22 (1.13)
Low Debt NOR: 1.3 (.91) CHE: .02 (-.56) FIN: -1.17 (-.57)
(≤60%) NZL: .31 (-.88)
SWE: .35 (-.87)
Under IMF/EU bailout GRE: 5.25 (6.68)
ISL: 3.76 (5.28) IRE: 2.05 (2.86)
Averages .83 (1.26) .19 (.08)  -.25 (.01)
with USA: .62 (1.10) w/o USA: -.23 (-.03)
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welfare regime,17 and they are EMU members. During the period under study, all featured 
fragmented government structures (minority or coalition governments), thereby removing 
government type as an alternative explanation. Moreover, the former two are parliamentary 
democracies while the latter two are mixed democracies. Importantly, Spain and Italy have 
economies of comparable size and, although Italy had a higher debt, both had foreign debt ratios 
of about 50% in 2008-2009 (Gros, 2013: 508), while Portugal and France had similar levels of 
inherited debt and increases in debt (see below), thereby excluding economic size, the 
composition of debt or (change in) debt level as alternate explanations. External conditionality 
can also be ruled out as Portugal was bailed out in April/May 2011 and Spain in June 2012. 
 
The Spain-Italy comparison 
 Spain and Italy held parliamentary elections in early 2008 that yielded a single-party 
minority left government—reelection of Prime Minister Zapatero—and a right-wing coalition 
government—led by PM Berlusconi—respectively. Even though Spain underwent a severe and 
Italy a mild banking crisis, both countries were hard hit by the GFC, both experiencing a GDP 
decline of -7.2% in 2008-2009. Despite enacting larger stimulus and financial bailout packages 
in 2008-2009, Spain was in a much more favorable position regarding the level of debt—the 
Spanish debt climbed from 42.4% of GDP in 2007 to 62.9% in 2009 whereas the Italian debt 
increased from 112.4% of GDP to 128% during the same period (Table 8). Although the distinct 
banking models and systems in Spain and Italy might explain why the former but not the latter 
experienced a late (i.e., post-2010) full-fledged sovereign debt crisis (Quaglia and Royo, 2015), 
given the initial economic conditions and timing, it is not clear why Spain implemented more 
austere fiscal policies (net of the bailout of financial institutions) than Italy in 2010 (Table 7). 
                                                          
17 In the comparative welfare literature, the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish welfare systems are usually 
included in the conservative model together with France and Germany, although there are important 
distinctions between the southern and continental types, notably regarding the role of the family. Yet, it 
is unclear how this distinction would explain away the different outcomes in Portugal and France.  
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Table 8.  Economic indicators 2007-2010 (selected countries) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the percentage increase between 2007 and 2009 
 
The analysis of the Spanish case relies on the detailed account by Dellepiane and 
Hardiman (2012). Spain’s initial response to the Great Recession was resolutely Keynesian. 
Re-elected in March 2008 on a pledge to pursue expansionary fiscal policy including an income 
tax rebate and a new-born grant, the Socialist government adopted a counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy consisting of tax cuts and extra welfare entitlements, arguing that the economic shock 
required active fiscal policy to support growth, protect employment and alleviate rising 
unemployment. This Keynesian stance was maintained throughout 2008 and most of 2009. 
As the severity of the crisis became clear in late 2009, the Zapatero government adopted 
a 2010 budget that projected to phase out the extraordinary stimulus and to raise taxes, including 
the cancellation of the tax rebate and a 1.5% VAT increase. In the early phase of consolidation, 
the government was committed to a “Social-Democratic approach to crisis” whose objective 
was to protect social spending. In January 2010, against the background of a rapidly worsening 
international economic environment, the government announced emergency measures18 to 
                                                          
18 Under Plan de Acción Immediata 2010 and Plan de Austeridad 2011-13. 
 debt Δ debt  bond yields 
 2009 2007-09 2007 2010 
     
Spain 62.9 20.5 (48.3) 4.31 4.25 
     
Italy 128.0 15.6 (13.9)  4.49 4.04 
     
Portugal 93.5 18.0 (23.8) 4.42 5.40 
     
France 91.2 18.3 (25.1) 4.30 3.12 




intensify fiscal consolidation including spending cuts of 0.5% of GDP, a freeze on public sector 
recruitment and other cost control measures. 
While these measures were thought to be introduced gradually, the government, facing 
mounting financial market pressure as a result of the contagion of the Greek crisis (i.e., 
IMF/EU bailout of Greece in May 2010), adopted a policy U-turn by introducing extensive 
spending cuts in May 2010. An emergency budget speeded up the pace of fiscal adjustment, 
aiming at €15bn in spending cuts for the second half of 2010 and into 2011, or 1.5% of GDP. 
Saving measures included civil servant wage cuts of 5% in 2010 and a wage freeze in 2011, 
cuts of 15% to politicians’ pay, changes to pension entitlements, withdrawal of the new-born 
grant, cancellation of dependency benefits and cuts to the public capital program. The goal was 
to achieve a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60.1% for 2010, instead of the planned 65.9%. In short, in 
the wake of the financial rescue plan for Greece and ongoing turbulence in bond markets, the 
government deepened the austerity program and resolutely switched the policy paradigm away 
from tax increases to spending cuts. 
 Did the more severe turn to austerity in Spain compared to Italy enable the Spanish 
government to borrow at lower costs than the Italian government in international markets? The 
answer is “no.” In 2010, the long-term government bond yields stood at 4.25% in Spain and 
4.04% in Italy (Table 8). The pattern is similar if I consider the extended window of 2010-2011: 
the Spanish government cut spending by 3.09% of GDP over 2010-2011 (budget consolidation 
of 4.04% of GDP) while the Italian government reduced outlays by only 0.65% (fiscal 
adjustment of 1.33%). More austerity did not translate into lower borrowings costs: interest 
rates on 10-year bonds stood at 5.44% in Spain and at 5.42% in Italy in 2011.19 In sum, 
compared to the right-wing Berlusconi government, the left-wing Zapatero government’s 
                                                          
19 Due to ECB interventions in December 2011 and February 2012, Italy and Spain benefited from a 
temporary reduction in borrowing costs (Quaglia and Royo 2015). ECB President Mario Draghi’s 
“whatever it takes” statement was made in July 2012, in the wake of Spain’s bailout. 
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greater commitment to fiscal adjustment just about enabled it to overcome its credibility deficit 
toward bond investors, evidenced by the fact that Spain was able to maintain its borrowing costs 
at about the same rate than Italy. In other words, the Spain-Italy comparison suggests that who 
governs and the associated (lack of) credibility of the fiscal adjustments as appraised by market 
actors has considerable analytical leverage in explaining the different fiscal policy outputs. 
 
The Portugal-France comparison 
 Economic fundamentals at the onset of 2010 were similar. Both countries experienced 
a year-on-year change in GDP of 4.8%. Between 2007 and 2009, public debt rose from 75.5% 
of GDP to 93.5% in Portugal and from 72.9% to 91.2% in France (Table 8).  
The analysis of the Portuguese case draws on the in-depth study by Pereira and Wemans 
(2015). The government provided aid to the ailing financial sector and pursued expansionary 
policy in 2008-2009. In the run-up to the September 2009 election, the Socialist (single-party 
majority) government agreed to a wage increase for civil servants of 2.9%, and it reduced VAT 
by 1 percentage point. The Socialists won the election but would henceforth govern as a single 
party minority government (though forming a majority with other left-leaning parties). 
Due to the election, the new budget was only promulgated in April 2010. Amidst 
pressures from different lobbies to increase spending, the government introduced austerity 
measures: by mid-year, the pay freeze in the public sector was continued, the wages of public 
managers were curbed, and VAT was brought back to its pre-election level. The reason was 
that the Greek fallout had an overwhelming effect on the Portuguese economy, with the risk 
premium on government ten-year bond rapidly increasing, amongst nervousness in financial 
markets that the government was not taking appropriate measures to put its house in order. 
The 2011 budget, presented in October 2010, was the first budget with a clear objective of fiscal 
tightening. It included wage cuts in the public sector, a reduction in social expenditure, a 
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tightening of tax benefits and a 2 percentage point VAT increase. These and other measures 
announced in March 2011 were unsuccessful to appease financial markets, resulting in the 
government seeking assistance from the Troika (IMF-EU-ECB) in May 2011. 
Both countries implemented austerity packages of about .80% of GDP in 2010.  
However, the tax/spending mix varied: Portugal cut spending by .77% of GDP whereas France, 
under the right-leaning Sarkozy (surplus coalition) government, increased spending by .12% 
(Table 7). While the interest rate on 10-year government bond increased from 4.42% to 5.40% 
in Portugal between 2007 and 2010, it decreased from 4.30% to 3.12% in France (Table 8). The 
Portugal-France comparison thus suggests that a stronger commitment by left governments to 
reigning in spending than non-left governments at an otherwise equal level of commitment to 
budget consolidation is no guarantee for containing rising borrowing costs. It suggests that left 
governments carry a stigma in the eyes of bond market actors that has not equivalent for right 
governments. 
The Spain-Portugal comparison illustrates the trade-off left governments face. The 
Portuguese case resembles the Spanish one, though relative to Spain, commitment to fiscal 
consolidation in Portugal was less decisive and delayed. Portugal entered 2010 with 
fundamentals that were only slightly worse than those of Spain (Table 8). The comparison 
indicates that against the backdrop of high and/or rapidly rising debt, bond market investors 
compel left governments to choose between either limited budget consolidation/spending cuts 
and rising yields on government debt (Portugal) or extensive fiscal adjustment and affordable 
borrowing costs (Spain). 
One caveat must be made: I do not provide direct evidence showing that fiscal policies 
in left-leaning Spain and Portugal were influenced by rising yields or that they adopted austere 
measures to signal their credibility to appease financial markets, although at times the evidence 
presented goes in that direction. At other times, the evidence rather suggests that bond investors 
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reacted more harshly to these countries’ policies after they were announced or implemented. 
Adjudicating between the two in individual cases, which would require interviewing decision-
makers, goes beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, the patterns observed in the two 
pairwise comparisons are consistent with hypothesis one. 
 
4.2. Beyond the South European periphery 
Financial markets hung like a sword of Damocles not just over left governments in 
Southern Europe. High indebtedness among left governments were widespread, including in 
the UK and the US (72% and 89% of GDP in 2009, respectively). The UK is a special case due 
to the election held in May 2010. On the surface, it would appear that the Labour government 
under PM Brown refrained from taking austerity measures, whereas the Conservative‒Liberal-
Democrat Cameron-Clegg coalition acted swiftly to consolidate the budget. However, this is 
inaccurate. First, during the pre-election campaign, there was a cross-party consensus on the 
need for deficit reduction—partisan differences, if any, concerned the pace (and composition) 
of fiscal rebalancing (Hay, 2010, 2013). Second, the Labour government took measures to 
improve the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, including higher taxation on incomes over 
£150,000 and a restriction on tax allowances on incomes above £100,000 to come into effect in 
April 2010, and announced a 0.5% increase in the National Insurance Contribution and higher 
duties on alcohol, tobacco and fuel from April 2010 (Budd, 2010: 43). Third, the emergency 
budget issued by the centre-right government after the election deferred fiscal balancing to late 
2010/early 2011 (Hay, 2010: 396, 2013). The VAT hike from 17.5% to 20%, the single largest 
tax rise, was postponed until January 2011. In short, it is the Labour government that initiated 
the turn to austerity, albeit predominantly by means of tax increases (see also Table 7). 
To the question if there was an alternative to deficit reduction in the UK in 2010, writing 
in the midst of events Hay (2010: 399) notes that “there is a clear and obvious danger that any 
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stepping back from this be taken by the markets as an indication of the likelihood of default on 
sovereign debt”. Moreover, the power of finance was on display earlier on, in March 2009, 
when PM Brown, one of the staunchest Keynesian world leaders at the time, withdrew his plan 
to introduce another stimulus package. The immediate cause was “a failed gilts auction that 
produced reluctance and fear in the Ministry of the Exchequer regarding the government’s 
ability to finance additional debt” (Mandelkern, 2016: 239). In all, this suggests that the shadow 
of financial markets loomed large over the left-leaning British government. 
Similarly, the rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded the long-term credit rating 
of the US from AAA to A+ under President Obama in August 2011, a market sanction related 
to the lack of commitment to deficit reduction by the Obama administration in 2010-2011 
(Table 7). 
By contrast, the available evidence suggests that financial markets played a negligible 
role in the two other cases with left majority governments in 2010.20 This comports with my 
theory. Indeed, Australia and Norway were far from experiencing a debt crisis: public debt 
stood at 19.4% and 48.9% of GDP in 2009, respectively, among the lowest in the OECD world. 
In the midst of the cataclysmic events of 2007-2009, it has taken time for a consolidated 
crisis discourse to emerge. As Hay (2013) has convincingly argued, the dominant discourse that 
emerged from the battle of interpretations is a “crisis of debt” discourse (see also Blyth, 2013). 
While the response to the question if the crisis that began in late 2009 is a “crisis of debt” or a 
“crisis of growth” may vary, the fact is that it has been widely perceived and accepted as a 
sovereign debt crisis. If anything, this particular crisis definition dovetails with my account of 
the role of financial markets in the crisis of the late 2000s/early 2010s. 
Building on the logic of welfare state retrenchment (Armingeon et al., 2016; Green-
Pedersen, 2002; Ross, 2000), a prominent alternative explanation is that left governments pro-
                                                          
20 See Mandelkern (2016) for an account of Australia. 
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actively reduce social spending—the single largest government outlay—in periods of fiscal 
consolidation to be able to shape cutbacks according to their interests. The Spanish and 
Portuguese cases contradict this interpretation as both governments were initially committed to 
a social-democratic approach to fiscal consolidation aimed at protecting social spending before 
being forced into reversing their course. Moreover, the fact that left governments were more 
likely to cut spending than non-left governments in 2010 is not consistent with the finding that 
left parties shifted to the left with regard to welfare state issues in their programmatic positions 
after 2008 (Bremer, 2018). Together, this points to a growing discrepancy between what left 
parties say they will do and what they do once in office, suggesting that austerity is imposed 
externally rather than a domestic political choice. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 I do not find any support for the claim that left governments pursued more expansionary 
and/or redistributive fiscal policies than non-left governments during the international 
recessions of the early 1980s, early 1990s, and late 2000s/early 2010s. I do not find any 
evidence either for the proposition that left governments are more inclined to sustain 
expansionary fiscal policy and/or discretionary spending when the economy begins to recover. 
I thus do not find partisan effects of the “old asymmetry” type over the cycle. I find that left 
governments were less likely to engage in fiscal stimulus in the 1993 downturn (but no less 
likely to consolidate in the 1994 upturn) and more likely to consolidate budgets in the 2010 
recovery (but no more likely to stimulate in the 2008-2009 and 2012 recessions). These results 
do not square with the partisan model of counter- vs. pro-cyclical fiscal policy behavior along 
the cycle (the “old symmetry”). Instead, they amount to a new asymmetrical pattern of partisan 
fiscal policy characterized by more fiscal conservatism by left governments over the cycle. They 
question the commonly-held view that partisan effects have declined over time. 
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Furthermore, the results point to financial globalization as a driver of the austerity 
measures implemented by left governments in advanced democracies during the last two crises, 
particularly the GFC. The analysis of quantitative and qualitative data suggests that bond market 
investors compelled highly indebted left governments to pursue more restrictive budgetary and 
spending policies than their right-leaning counterparts over the full 2008-2013 cycle to contain 
the economic fallout of capital withdrawal and soaring borrowing costs. While weaker, the 
evidence tells a similar story in the early 1990s. The analysis indicates that the GFC does not 
represent a clear break with past crises, rather crisis responses in the last two crises sets them 
apart from those in the early 1980s. 
It is tempting to see the switching partisan effects driven by market forces during 
defining moments such as international crises as one neglected yet important economic origin 
of our political discontents, to turn Peter Hall’s (2013) motto on its head. Regarding left parties, 
they find themselves caught between the (radicalized) demands of erstwhile constituents and 
the fiscal (and monetary) policy realities of a global economy fully in tune with the 
neoliberalized policy paradigm, a conundrum they have yet to resolve if they wish to remain a 
significant (pro-EU) progressive movement. The large debts contracted by states to fight against 
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Globalization and austerity: 
Flipping partisan effects on fiscal policy during (recent) international crises 
 
 
Table A1.  Variable definition and data sources, robustness analysis 
Variable name Definition / data source Expectation / note 
Election year 
(dummy) 
1 if a given year is an 
election year. 
Data are from Armingeon 
et al. (2012).   
According to political business-cycle theory, 
incumbent governments face electoral 
incentives to loosen budgetary discipline as 
elections approach, such that governments 
in election years should be more prone to 




1 if single party majority 
government. 
Data are from Armingeon 
et al. (2012, 2020).  Same 
construction as 
government partisanship, 
e.g. in 2010, one-party 
government is measured 
as the average over 2009-
2010 (hence it can take 
the value of 0.5). 
One-party governments should be associated 
with more fiscal stimulus as such 
governments can act more decisively and 
swiftly in response to crisis, whereas 
fragmented government structures such as 
minority and coalitions governments should 
be associated with less budgetary discipline 
once deficits are created since each coalition 
partner seeks to protect the budgetary needs 
of its constituency. 
EMU   
(dummy) 
1 if signatory of the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1990s); 1 if member of 
the EMU (2000s) 
Captures the fiscally conservative bias that 
may be associated with EMU fiscal rules (in 
1990s) or euro area membership (in 2000s). 
Short-term 
interest rates 
Control variable for 
monetary policy, lagged 
by one year.  
OECD (Economic 
Outlook No. 74&90). 
Short-term interest rates should be positively 
correlated with fiscal consolidation during 
economic upturns, as fiscal policy becomes 
the tool of choice to balance budgets when 
interest rates are high. 
Current account  Current account balance 
as % of GDP in the pre-
recession/recovery year. 
Positive numbers indicate 
a surplus.  
Data from OECD.Stat. 
Arguably, debt is an epiphenomenon, that is, 
as long as governments run a current 
account surplus they are solvable, and hence 
possess fiscal room for maneuver in crisis. 
This may explain why JP has a huge debt 
but favorable scores from credit agencies. 
Banking crisis 
(dummy) 
1 if banking crisis. 
Data are from the World 
Bank's Global Financial 
Development Database.   
The early 1990s and the late 2000s crises 
featured banking crises in several countries. 
FI, NO and SE had a banking crisis in 1992, 
while AU, CA, FI, JP, NZ and NO did not 
have a banking crisis in 2009. 
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Bank bailouts Used amounts of 
recapitalizations and asset 
purchases in 2008-2009. 
Data from Laeven and 
Valencia (2011: Table 1).   
The larger the bailouts in downturns, the 
more governments are likely to consolidate 
during upturns.   
We tried an alternative measure, total bank 
support, which includes guarantees. The 
results are very similar. 
IMF/EU bailout 
(dummy) 
1 if bailed out by IMF 
and/or the EU 
 
The dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 
IS and for IE bailed out in 2008 and 2010, 
respectively, should be positively associated 
with fiscal consolidation and spending cuts.  
Note: Laeven L and Valencia F (2011) The Real Effects of Financial Sector Interventions 





Table A2. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus in 1993, robustness analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Left -0.018* -0.024** -0.022** -0.022** -0.019* -0.020** -0.020*  -0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.009) 
LeftadjUSACAN        -0.022**  
        (0.009)  
Debt -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.041** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
GDP growth -0.165 -0.164 -0.277* -0.232 -0.151 -0.082 -0.174 -0.177 -0.069 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.151) (0.147) (0.144) (0.154) (0.142) (0.132) (0.156) 
Automatic stab. -0.083 -0.109 -0.095 -0.081 -0.107 -0.055 -0.075 -0.081 -0.085 
 (0.069) (0.085) (0.066) (0.067) (0.084) (0.068) (0.093) (0.065) (0.066) 
Trade 0.0073 0.009 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.0003 0.010 0.007 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0150) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
Election year -0.398         
 (0.689)         
One-party gov.  -0.572        
  (0.894)        
EMU   -0.968       
   (0.694)       
S.t. interest rates    -0.076      
    (0.073)      
Stimulus9091     0.124     
     (0.196)     
Current account      0.169    
      (0.139)    
Banking crisis       -0.023   
       (1.120)   
Constant 4.479*** 5.150** 4.451*** 5.024*** 4.061*** 4.399*** 4.131*** 4.387*** 4.263*** 
 (1.418) (2.039) (1.238) (1.517) (1.291) (1.256) (1.341) (1.254) (1.235) 
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.54 0.56 0.57 




Table A3. Government partisanship and fiscal consolidation in 2010, robustness analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left 0.022** 0.020** 0.021** 0.019* 0.018* 0.019* 0.019** 0.021** 0.018***  0.016 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)  (0.013) 
LeftadjUSACAN          0.022**  
          (0.009)  
Debt 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.017** 0.033*** 0.028** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
GDP growth -0.288** -0.258** -0.291** -0.275** -0.262** -0.232** -0.283*** -0.287** -0.147* -0.307*** -0.328** 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.107) (0.095) (0.109) (0.071) (0.094) (0.133) 
Automatic stab. 0.207* 0.259** 0.184 0.179 0.164 0.166 0.135 0.191 0.148* 0.236* 0.166 
 (0.116) (0.120) (0.123) (0.117) (0.118) (0.113) (0.114) (0.118) (0.074) (0.116) (0.165) 
Trade 0.008 0.010* 0.008 0.008 0.010* 0.009* 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.010* 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
Election year -0.483           
 (0.666)           
One-party gov.  1.309          
  (0.950)          
EMU   0.146         
   (0.624)         
S.t. interest rates    0.092        
    (0.144)        
Stimulus0809     0.137       
     (0.144)       
Current account      -0.073      
      (0.056)      
Banking crisis       1.048     
       (0.649)     
Bank bailout        0.010    
        (0.084)    
IMF/EU bailout         3.162***   
48 
 
         (0.645)   
Constant -4.650* -6.232** -4.373* -4.376* -4.580* -4.018* -3.788* -4.509* -3.122** -5.459** -3.401 
 (2.195) (2.435) (2.341) (2.214) (2.165) (2.154) (2.116) (2.246) (1.437) (2.304) (3.044) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.87 0.68 0.66 





Table A4. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus in 2012, conditional on debt level (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.011 0.013 0.025 0.006  0.024 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.016)  (0.023) 
Left*debt -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005** -0.0001  -0.0005* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
LeftadjUSACAN          0.014  
          (0.019)  
LeftadjUSACAN*debt          -0.0003  
          (0.0002)  
Debt -0.001 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
GDP growth 0.0815 0.123 -0.211 0.068 0.122 0.023 0.059 0.022 0.089 0.109 0.085 
 (0.199) (0.186) (0.187) (0.194) (0.173) (0.170) (0.192) (0.190) (0.153) (0.197) (0.217) 
Automatic stab. 0.085 0.078 0.099 0.087 0.113 0.082 0.086 0.113 0.058 0.063 0.151 
 (0.100) (0.093) (0.079) (0.097) (0.088) (0.085) (0.096) (0.096) (0.079) (0.096) (0.121) 
Trade 0.001 -0.0004 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.0002 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.0045) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.0045) (0.008) 
Election year -0.057           
 (0.775)           
One-party gov.  -1.103          
  (0.875)          
EMU   -1.641**         
   (0.590)         
S.t. interest rates    -0.101        
    (0.347)        
Stimulus0809     -0.230*       
     (0.119)       
Current account      0.118**      
      (0.055)      
Banking crisis       -0.474     
       (0.768)     
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Bank bailout        0.095    
        (0.083)    
IMF/EU bailout         -1.966**   
         (0.674)   
Constant -1.770 -1.122 -2.584 -1.614 -1.329 -1.983 -1.513 -2.271 -1.375 -1.183 -3.138 
 (1.874) (1.818) (1.510) (1.929) (1.651) (1.602) (1.863) (1.800) (1.467) (1.823) (2.398) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.28 0.35 0.53 0.28 0.43 0.45 0.30 0.34 0.54 0.24 0.36 





Table A5. Government partisanship and fiscal consolidation in 2010, conditional on debt (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 0.009  -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)  (0.018) 
Left*debt 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0005** 0.0001  0.0006** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
LeftadjUSACAN          -0.005  
          (0.016)  
LeftadjUSACAN*debt          0.0004*  
          (0.0002)  
Debt 0.016 0.017* 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.013* 0.020* 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) 
GDP growth -0.225** -0.193* -0.222** -0.226** -0.201* -0.199* -0.228** -0.234** -0.141* -0.270*** -0.285** 
 (0.095) (0.091) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.100) (0.092) (0.099) (0.072) (0.090) (0.110) 
Automatic stab. 0.104 0.162 0.083 0.099 0.077 0.093 0.076 0.100 0.124 0.170 0.047 
 (0.115) (0.112) (0.117) (0.112) (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.081) (0.114) (0.141) 
Trade 0.007 0.008* 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.009* 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
Election year -0.119           
 (0.624)           
One-party gov.  1.262          
  (0.832)          
EMU   0.232         
   (0.554)         
S.t. interest rates    -0.015        
    (0.138)        
Stimulus0809     0.114       
     (0.129)       
Current account      -0.039      
      (0.055)      
Banking crisis       0.649     
       (0.637)     
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Bank bailout        -0.027    
        (0.076)    
IMF/EU bailout         2.846***   
         (0.761)   
Constant -2.090 -3.668 -1.700 -1.986 -2.113 -1.987 -1.916 -2.022 -2.514 -3.498 0.627 
 (2.308) (2.379) (2.368) (2.272) (2.214) (2.230) (2.194) (2.259) (1.636) (2.395) (2.877) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.88 0.74 0.79 




Table A6. Government partisanship and spending cuts in 1984, conditional on debt level 
(robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Left -0.026* -0.017 -0.020* -0.017  
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)  
Left*debt 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003  
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)  
LeftadjUSACAN     -0.026* 
     (0.012) 
LeftadjUSACAN*debt     0.0004 
     (0.0002) 
Debt 0.005 0.009 0.020* 0.009 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
GDP growth -0.159 -0.126 -0.317*** -0.084 -0.156 
 (0.102) (0.089) (0.084) (0.126) (0.092) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.086 -0.078 -0.031 -0.090 -0.078 
 (0.066) (0.055) (0.050) (0.081) (0.059) 
Trade 0.020 0.010 0.011 0.020* 0.019* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Election year -0.094     
 (0.591)     
One-party gov.  -0.918*    
  (0.499)    
S.t. interest rates   0.035   
   (0.034)   
Stimulus81    -0.177  
    (0.142)  
Constant 0.677 1.174 -0.721 0.207 0.725 
 (0.874) (0.811) (0.865) (1.044) (0.811) 
Observations 19 19 18 18 19 
R-squared 0.62 0.71 0.81 0.65 0.64 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7. Government partisanship and spending cuts in 2010, conditional on debt level (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.021* -0.002  -0.028* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.015) 
Left*debt 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0002  0.0005** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
LeftadjUSACAN          -0.016  
          (0.014)  
LeftadjUSACAN*debt          0.0004**  
          (0.0002)  
Debt -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.008) (0.0076) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
GDP growth -0.181** -0.161** -0.181** -0.179** -0.193** -0.172** -0.180** -0.216*** -0.111** -0.233*** -0.225** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.078) (0.073) (0.069) (0.050) (0.075) (0.092) 
Automatic stab. -0.033 -0.002 -0.034 -0.041 -0.028 -0.042 -0.043 -0.033 -0.018 0.003 -0.086 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.078) (0.056) (0.095) (0.119) 
Trade 0.008* 0.009** 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 0.008** 0.008* 0.013*** 0.003 0.009** 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Election year -0.151           
 (0.478)           
One-party gov.  0.756          
  (0.657)          
EMU   -0.101         
   (0.427)         
S.t. interest rates    0.012        
    (0.106)        
Stimulus0809     -0.065       
     (0.100)       
Current account      -0.013      
      (0.042)      
Banking crisis       0.065     
       (0.506)     
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Bank bailout        -0.096*    
        (0.053)    
IMF/EU bailout         2.384***   
         (0.529)   
Constant 1.127 0.239 1.103 1.221 1.297 1.241 1.244 1.175 0.809 0.512 3.047 
 (1.768) (1.880) (1.825) (1.744) (1.718) (1.735) (1.740) (1.579) (1.139) (1.995) (2.421) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.90 0.68 0.78 




Table A8: Government partisanship and fiscal consolidation in 1984, conditional on financial unsustainability (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Left -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011  
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
Left*fin. unsust. -0.025** -0.023*** -0.022** -0.020* -0.020**  
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)  
LeftadjUSACAN      -0.008 
      (0.006) 
LeftadjUSACAN*fin. unsust.      -0.024*** 
      (0.007) 
Financial unsustainability 1.071** 0.970** 1.018** 1.059** 0.678 1.034*** 
 (0.407) (0.324) (0.349) (0.355) (0.385) (0.313) 
GDP growth -0.112 -0.094 -0.147 -0.122 -0.171 -0.105 
 (0.157) (0.141) (0.147) (0.229) (0.136) (0.130) 
Automatic stabilizers 0.027 0.012 0.012 -0.036 0.067 0.031 
 (0.089) (0.081) (0.087) (0.111) (0.086) (0.078) 
Trade -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Election year -0.328      
 (0.869)      
One-party gov.  -0.756     
  (0.637)     
S.t. interest rates   -0.036    
   (0.080)    
Stimulus81    -0.258   
    (0.203)   
Current account     -0.183  
     (0.130)  
Constant 1.171 1.695 1.452 1.245 0.371 1.109 
 (1.092) (1.065) (1.455) (1.228) (0.925) (0.827) 
Observations 18 18 18 17 18 18 
R-squared 0.58 0.63 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.62 




Table A9. Government partisanship and fiscal consolidation in 2010, conditional on financial unsustainability (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 0.018** 0.017** 0.021** 0.019** 0.020** 0.018**  0.015 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.010) 
Left*fin. unsust. 0.012* 0.013* 0.011 0.011 0.012* 0.013* 0.010 0.011* 0.006  0.011 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) 
LeftadjUSACAN          0.021**  
          (0.007)  
LeftadjUSACAN*fin. unsust.          0.012*  
          (0.006)  
Financial unsustainability 0.407 0.395 0.508 0.454 0.362 0.464 0.415 0.445 0.272 0.460 0.399 
 (0.339) (0.345) (0.383) (0.337) (0.336) (0.358) (0.327) (0.320) (0.278) (0.328) (0.412) 
GDP growth -0.070 -0.075 -0.059 -0.056 -0.054 -0.075 -0.083 -0.035 -0.051 -0.073 -0.125 
 (0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.085) (0.085) (0.071) (0.082) (0.115) 
Automatic stab. 0.108 0.082 0.117 0.089 0.074 0.103 0.068 0.095 0.098 0.134 0.123 
 (0.096) (0.104) (0.101) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.089) (0.076) (0.093) (0.134) 
Trade 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.0009 0.007 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0038) (0.004) (0.009) 
Election year -0.343           
 (0.555)           
One-party gov.  -0.282          
  (0.857)          
EMU   -0.326         
   (0.575)         
S.t. interest rates    0.113        
    (0.117)        
Stimulus0809     0.120       
     (0.118)       
Current account      0.031      
      (0.061)      
Banking crisis       0.714     
       (0.569)     
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Bank bailout        0.094    
        (0.061)    
IMF/EU bailout         2.486**   
         (0.847)   
Constant -1.654 -1.214 -1.853 -1.571 -1.699 -1.598 -1.338 -1.738 -1.443 -2.310 -1.401 
 (1.590) (1.852) (1.681) (1.550) (1.553) (1.589) (1.526) (1.489) (1.273) (1.641) (2.118) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.87 0.80 0.81 




Table A10. Government partisanship and spending increases in 2008-2009, conditional on financial unsustainability (robustness 
analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Left 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.008  0.004 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) 
Left*fin. unsust. -0.028** -0.025** -0.027** -0.029* -0.028** -0.028** -0.028** -0.017  -0.024** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)  (0.011) 
LeftadjUSACAN         0.005  
         (0.008)  
LeftadjUSACAN*fin. unsust.         -0.030**  
         (0.011)  
Financial unsustainability 0.688 0.659 0.688 0.780 0.698 0.840* 0.767 0.619 0.838* 0.409 
 (0.467) (0.438) (0.549) (0.492) (0.481) (0.434) (0.464) (0.466) (0.446) (0.474) 
GDP growth 0.047 0.097 0.086 0.087 0.114 0.099 0.087 0.047 0.074 0.219 
 (0.178) (0.162) (0.174) (0.182) (0.183) (0.162) (0.179) (0.171) (0.165) (0.179) 
Automatic stab. -0.054 -0.054 -0.108 -0.096 -0.090 -0.061 -0.098 -0.122 -0.078 -0.196 
 (0.121) (0.106) (0.118) (0.109) (0.109) (0.105) (0.112) (0.108) (0.105) (0.131) 
Trade 0.010* 0.012** 0.010* 0.011** 0.012** 0.013** 0.011* 0.011** 0.011** 0.014 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Election year 0.462          
 (0.616)          
One-party gov.  1.001         
  (0.665)         
EMU   0.171        
   (0.626)        
S.t. interest rates    0.010       
    (0.164)       
Current account     -0.022      
     (0.045)      
Banking crisis      -0.854     
      (0.567)     
Bank bailout       -0.005    
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       (0.073)    
IMF/EU bailout        -2.192   
        (1.998)   
Constant 1.859 1.832 2.849 2.683 2.653 2.695 2.742 2.883* 2.326 4.487** 
 (2.013) (1.680) (1.755) (1.762) (1.680) (1.574) (1.736) (1.632) (1.648) (1.869) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.52 0.57 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.52 





Table A11. Government partisanship and spending cuts in 1984, conditional on financial unsustainability (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Left -0.011* -0.009** -0.008 -0.004 -0.008  
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)  
Left*fin. unsust. -0.003 -0.0002 0.001 0.005 -0.0003  
 (0.007) (0.0051) (0.006) (0.007) (0.0063)  
LeftadjUSACAN      -0.011** 
      (0.004) 
LeftadjUSACAN*fin. unsust.      -0.001 
      (0.005) 
Financial unsustainability 0.464 0.309 0.347 0.443 0.356 0.367 
 (0.308) (0.230) (0.272) (0.257) (0.326) (0.240) 
GDP growth -0.204 -0.195* -0.248* -0.306* -0.238* -0.213* 
 (0.119) (0.100) (0.115) (0.165) (0.115) (0.100) 
Automatic stabilizers 0.039 0.018 0.022 -0.052 0.022 0.037 
 (0.067) (0.058) (0.068) (0.080) (0.073) (0.060) 
Trade 0.001 0.0003 0.008 0.014 0.008 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.0104) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Election year -0.527      
 (0.657)      
One-party gov.  -0.861*     
  (0.452)     
S.t. interest rates   -0.020    
   (0.062)    
Stimulus81    -0.258   
    (0.147)   
Current account     0.015  
     (0.110)  
Constant 0.534 1.022 0.442 0.805 0.209 0.294 
 (0.826) (0.754) (1.133) (0.887) (0.784) (0.634) 
Observations 18 18 18 17 18 18 
R-squared 0.66 0.73 0.64 0.70 0.63 0.68 




Table A12. Government partisanship and spending cuts in 2010, conditional on financial unsustainability (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left 0.013** 0.013** 0.014** 0.011* 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 0.011***  0.012 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.007) 
Left*fin. unsust. 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.009**  0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.005) 
LeftadjUSACAN          0.010*  
          (0.005)  
LeftadjUSACAN*fin. unsust.          0.014***  
          (0.004)  
Financial unsustainability -0.033 -0.045 0.149 0.001 -0.004 0.060 -0.032 -0.040 -0.138 -0.026 0.005 
 (0.221) (0.227) (0.235) (0.222) (0.224) (0.226) (0.227) (0.226) (0.161) (0.233) (0.305) 
GDP growth -0.116* -0.121* -0.096 -0.105* -0.124** -0.125** -0.115* -0.123* -0.101** -0.132** -0.123 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059) (0.060) (0.041) (0.058) (0.085) 
Automatic stab. 0.007 -0.018 0.033 -0.009 0.009 0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.009 0.001 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.060) (0.065) (0.063) (0.044) (0.066) (0.099) 
Trade 0.008*** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.009** 0.005* 0.009*** 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Election year -0.339           
 (0.361)           
One-party gov.  -0.292          
  (0.564)          
EMU   -0.590         
   (0.353)         
S.t. interest rates    0.081        
    (0.077)        
Stimulus0809     -0.071       
     (0.079)       
Current account      0.050      
      (0.038)      
Banking crisis       0.022     
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       (0.396)     
Bank bailout        -0.021    
        (0.043)    
IMF/EU bailout         1.953***   
         (0.490)   
Constant -0.056 0.394 -0.520 0.039 0.172 -0.047 0.077 0.117 0.136 -0.054 -0.008 
 (1.035) (1.219) (1.032) (1.020) (1.035) (1.004) (1.061) (1.052) (0.736) (1.164) (1.566) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.92 0.83 0.84 




Table A13. Government partisanship and fiscal policy in 1989-1991 
 DV: stimulus DV: spending increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Left -0.004 0.061 0.008 0.005 -0.021 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.042) (0.011) (0.018) (0.062) (0.018) 
Left*debt  -0.001   0.0005  
  (0.001)   (0.0011)  
Debt -0.049** -0.006  -0.051* -0.069  
 (0.021) (0.033)  (0.028) (0.048)  
Left*financial unsust.   -0.032**   -0.031 
   (0.013)   (0.021) 
Financial unsustainability   0.346   1.017 
   (0.572)   (0.922) 
GDP growth -0.303 -0.561 -0.302 -0.626 -0.521 -0.353 
 (0.463) (0.466) (0.404) (0.628) (0.687) (0.651) 
Automatic stabilizers 0.151 0.211 0.080 0.022 -0.003 0.045 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.132) (0.167) (0.181) (0.213) 
Trade 0.017 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.015 -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) 
Constant 1.463 -2.246 -0.438 3.009 4.522 1.049 
 (1.706) (2.785) (1.416) (2.312) (4.110) (2.284) 
Observations 20 20 19 20 20 19 
R-squared 0.37 0.47 0.53 0.27 0.29 0.27 





Table A14. Government partisanship and fiscal policy in 1991 
 DV: stimulus DV: spending increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Left -0.005 0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.027 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.010) (0.028) (0.012) 
Left*debt  -0.0002   0.0004  
  (0.0005)   (0.0005)  
Debt -0.025* -0.015  -0.025* -0.042  
 (0.013) (0.025)  (0.013) (0.025)  
Left*financial unsust.   -0.012   -0.012 
   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Financial unsustainability   0.046   0.326 
   (0.416)   (0.441) 
GDP growth -0.006 -0.004 -0.073 -0.044 -0.048 -0.162 
 (0.149) (0.153) (0.178) (0.146) (0.148) (0.189) 
Automatic stabilizers 0.123 0.138 0.097 -0.020 -0.047 0.009 
 (0.103) (0.112) (0.129) (0.101) (0.109) (0.137) 
Trade -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.019 0.019 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) 
Constant 0.731 -0.032 -0.552 1.643 2.999 -0.064 
 (1.213) (2.172) (1.248) (1.193) (2.100) (1.323) 
Observations 20 20 19 20 20 19 
R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.15 





Table A15. Government partisanship and fiscal policy in 2011-2012 
 DV: stimulus DV: spending increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Left -0.034** 0.033 -0.016 -0.018 0.031 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.010) (0.014) (0.026) (0.013) 
Left*debt  -0.0009***   -0.0007**  
  (0.0003)   (0.0003)  
Debt -0.020 0.004  0.0002 0.018  
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.0128) (0.014)  
Left*financial unsust.   -0.008   -0.007 
   (0.005)   (0.007) 
Financial unsustainability   -0.621   -0.148 
   (0.357)   (0.489) 
GDP growth 0.188 0.219 -0.086 0.352 0.375* 0.163 
 (0.232) (0.188) (0.162) (0.226) (0.206) (0.222) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.003 0.071 0.019 0.031 0.086 0.035 
 (0.151) (0.124) (0.097) (0.147) (0.136) (0.133) 
Trade 0.003 0.005 -0.0003 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.0050) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.614 -2.637 -1.719 -0.994 -3.393 -1.041 
 (2.817) (2.501) (1.531) (2.739) (2.734) (2.097) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.34 0.59 0.74 0.18 0.36 0.36 




Table A16. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus in 1989-1991, conditional on financial 
unsustainability (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Left -0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) (0.011) 
Left*financial unsust. -0.037*** -0.032** -0.033** -0.029** -0.022 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Financial unsustainability 0.543 0.425 0.500 -0.013 0.065 
 (0.482) (0.584) (0.654) (0.623) (0.579) 
GDP growth -0.666* 0.022 -0.283 -0.292 -0.191 
 (0.365) (0.550) (0.418) (0.393) (0.393) 
Automatic stabilizers 0.199 0.191 0.099 0.111 0.078 
 (0.119) (0.184) (0.141) (0.131) (0.126) 
Trade -0.016 0.004 0.005 0.013 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.02) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Election year 2.241**     
 (0.888)     
One-party gov.  1.403    
  (1.599)    
EMU   -0.513   
   (0.943)   
S.t interest rates    0.171  
    (0.133)  
Current account     -0.297 
     (0.203) 
Constant -2.263 -2.234 -0.360 -2.515 -1.065 
 (1.382) (2.496) (1.467) (2.127) (1.419) 
Observations 19 19 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.70 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.61 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A17: Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus in 2011-2012 (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left -0.037** -0.032** -0.030** -0.032* -0.025* -0.020* -0.034** -0.034** -0.006  -0.044** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.017) 
LeftadjUSACAN          -0.032**  
          (0.014)  
Debt -0.021 -0.020 -0.011 -0.020 -0.015 -0.004 -0.015 -0.022 -0.007 -0.019 -0.022 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
GDP growth 0.120 0.144 0.106 0.220 0.280 0.205 0.177 0.141 0.060 0.170 0.322 
 (0.234) (0.222) (0.214) (0.342) (0.220) (0.153) (0.222) (0.295) (0.173) (0.232) (0.259) 
Automatic stabilizers -0.025 -0.037 0.094 -0.006 0.043 0.092 0.040 0.010 0.052 -0.023 0.098 
 (0.149) (0.145) (0.144) (0.157) (0.142) (0.102) (0.146) (0.163) (0.111) (0.153) (0.203) 
Trade 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.003 -0.0004 -0.004 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.0074) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) 
Election year -1.148           
 (0.902)           
One-party gov.  -2.687          
  (1.574)          
EMU   -1.959**         
   (0.909)         
S.t interest rates    -0.072        
    (0.546)        
Stimulus0809     -0.392*       
     (0.201)       
Current account      0.253***      
      (0.053)      
Banking crisis       -1.645     
       (0.995)     
Bank bailout        0.043    
        (0.156)    
IMF/EU bailout         -3.611***   
         (0.910)   
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Constant 1.915 1.784 -1.265 0.736 1.032 -2.129 0.405 0.550 -1.613 1.059 0.258 
 (2.950) (2.758) (2.701) (3.048) (2.619) (1.945) (2.687) (2.907) (2.136) (2.909) (3.704) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.40 0.44 0.49 0.34 0.46 0.73 0.43 0.34 0.67 0.33 0.43 




Table A18. Government partisanship and fiscal stimulus in 2011-2012, conditional on debt level (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left 0.027 0.030 0.028 0.039 0.038* 0.024 0.027 0.043* 0.024  0.031 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021)  (0.028) 
Left*debt -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*  -0.001** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
LeftadjUSACAN          0.026  
          (0.026)  
LeftadjUSACAN*debt          -0.001**  
          (0.0003)  
Debt 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.003 -0.0004 0.003 0.001 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
GDP growth 0.185 0.183 0.154 0.321 0.302* 0.224* 0.213 0.015 0.111 0.173 0.277 
 (0.198) (0.181) (0.178) (0.277) (0.171) (0.122) (0.193) (0.226) (0.165) (0.204) (0.204) 
Automatic stab. 0.055 0.039 0.134 0.064 0.111 0.127 0.078 0.143 0.079 0.031 0.174 
 (0.128) (0.121) (0.120) (0.128) (0.112) (0.082) (0.128) (0.129) (0.106) (0.137) (0.161) 
Trade 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.002 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) 
Election year -0.554           
 (0.784)           
One-party gov.  -2.064          
  (1.300)          
EMU   -1.465*         
   (0.770)         
S.t. interest rates    -0.227        
    (0.441)        
Stimulus0809     -0.359**       
     (0.156)       
Current account      0.211***      
      (0.0441)      
Banking crisis       -0.531     
       (0.973)     
Bank bailout        0.189    
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        (0.125)    
IMF/EU bailout         -
2.682** 
  
         (1.004)   
Constant -1.802 -1.487 -3.632 -2.312 -2.125 -3.914** -2.408 -3.437 -2.852 -1.504 -4.212 
 (2.802) (2.497) (2.376) (2.637) (2.231) (1.646) (2.592) (2.463) (2.127) (2.760) (3.254) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.60 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.70 0.84 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.51 0.68 




Table A19. Government partisanship and spending increases in 2011-2012, conditional on debt level (robustness analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Left 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.031 0.037 0.023 0.021 0.037 0.020  0.034 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.021)  (0.032) 
Left*debt -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0007** -0.0002  -0.0007* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
LeftadjUSACAN          0.027  
          (0.026)  
LeftadjUSACAN*debt          -0.0006*  
          (0.0003)  
Debt 0.016 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.022 0.023* 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) 
GDP growth 0.352 0.343 0.331 0.373 0.470** 0.379** 0.364 0.253 0.241 0.356 0.427* 
 (0.218) (0.204) (0.209) (0.305) (0.183) (0.166) (0.208) (0.260) (0.168) (0.205) (0.233) 
Automatic stab. 0.076 0.058 0.129 0.086 0.132 0.136 0.098 0.129 0.097 0.058 0.231 
 (0.142) (0.135) (0.141) (0.141) (0.120) (0.111) (0.138) (0.148) (0.108) (0.137) (0.184) 
Trade 0.003 0.0005 0.006 0.003 -0.0003 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.0016 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) 
Election year -0.358           
 (0.867)           
One-party gov.  -1.846          
  (1.460)          
EMU   -0.989         
   (0.903)         
S.t. interest rates    0.005        
    (0.487)        
Stimulus0809     -0.414**       
     (0.167)       
Current account      0.186***      
      (0.0597)      
Banking crisis       -0.863     
       (1.051)     
Bank bailout        0.113    
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        (0.144)    
IMF/EU bailout         -3.310***   
         (1.024)   
Constant -2.853 -2.364 -4.065 -3.400 -2.802 -4.519* -3.021 -3.871 -3.658 -2.610 -5.976 
 (3.097) (2.805) (2.785) (2.908) (2.390) (2.229) (2.799) (2.833) (2.169) (2.772) (3.715) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 19 
R-squared 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.55 0.61 0.39 0.38 0.62 0.35 0.46 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
